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I. CHALLENGES IN END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING
nternational comparisons of health outcomes indicate that
the United States ranks poorly among wealthy, developed
countries on all measures of health, with the exception of self-
reported subjective health status. In the United States, overall
health is poor compared with European countries, yet Ameri-
cans believe that they are in good shape.1 This striking evi-
dence of self-delusion is symptomatic of the larger problem that
we face with respect to life and death—the unwillingness to
confront mortality.2 Patients and physicians often avoid dis-
cussing the inevitability of death and planning for it, and
therefore miss opportunities to make choices that comport with
their values and preferences. In the absence of such decisions,
the default model is to “err on the side of life” which often re-
sults in overtreatment or inappropriate prolongation of life and
avoidable suffering.
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. J.D.
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Peter Heinegg, Grayson McCouch,
and René Reich-Graefe for their comments and suggestions. © Barbara Ann
Noah, 2015. The author has not granted rights to reprint this article under a
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial license. Please contact the
author directly for reprint permission.
1. See James Banks & James P. Smith, International Comparisons in
Health Economics: Evidence from Aging Studies, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 57−81
(2012) (reporting higher rates of diabetes, obesity, stroke, cancer, and infant
mortality, as well as lower life expectancies); see also James Banks et al.,
Disease and Disadvantage in the United States and in England, 295 JAMA
2037, 2039−40 (2006) (finding the greatest health disparities between the two
populations in the lowest socioeconomic status groups); Steven H. Woolf &
Laudan Y. Aron, The U.S. Health Disadvantage Relative to Other High-
Income Countries, 309 JAMA 771, 771−72 (2013) (describing data from a re-
port by the National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine that
documents lower life expectancies and higher rates of disease in the United
States in all age groups compared with that in sixteen other wealthy, devel-
oped countries).
2. See generally Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in Prepar-
ing for Death, 21 ELDER L.J. 1 (2013) (discussing cultural, legal, and other
reasons why patients and physicians avoid making end-of-life decisions); see
also Craig Bowron, Our Unrealistic Attitudes About Death, Through a Doc-
tor’s Eyes, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-unrealistic-views-of-death-
through-a-doctors-eyes/2012/01/31/gIQAeaHpJR_story.html (“For many
Americans, modern medical advances have made death seem more like an
option than an obligation.”).
I
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Overtreatment at the end of life arises not just from the pa-
tient’s denial of mortality, but from a multiplicity of systemic
influences such as lack of training in end-of-life care and the
fear of accusations of hastening death.3 Patients may have dif-
ficulty acknowledging that death is imminent, but worse, phy-
sicians often do not inform their patients that their prognosis is
poor or even that they are dying.4 In general, the medical sys-
tem in the United States places much more emphasis on
treatment and cure than on broader notions of patient care
that include alleviation of physical and emotional suffering in
the final stages of terminal illness. Many physicians still view
death as a failure of medicine rather than as a natural event
that requires all of the physician’s skill to make it as peaceful
and dignified as possible.5
Research into trends in end-of-life care documents the exist-
ence and ill effects of these interrelated phenomena. The ideal
of a “good death” surely must mean different things to different
people but probably includes some common elements such as
avoiding physical suffering.6 In addition, most patients state
3. See infra notes 111 to 114 and accompanying text.
4. See Nancy L. Keating, et al., Physician Factors Associated With Dis-
cussions About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER 998, 1001 (2010) (concluding
that most physicians surveyed indicated that they would not discuss end-of-
life decisions and choices with terminally ill patients until they exhibited
symptoms or there were no remaining treatments available); Bethel Ann
Powers et al., Meaning and Practice of Palliative Care for Hospitalized Older
Adults with Life Limiting Illnesses, 2011 J. AGING RES. 1, 7 (2011), available
at http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jar/2011/406164/ (discussing the distinc-
tions between and intersection of palliative care and end-of-life care and rec-
ommending better training of healthcare providers to understand that “end of
life” is not a “well-demarcated period of time before death.”).
5. See infra notes 67−75 and accompanying text (discussing goals of the
Liverpool Care Pathway).
6. For a review of the research on the multiple dimensions that influence
perceived quality of dying and death, see Sarah Hales et al., The Quality of
Dying and Death, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 912, 912−18 (2008) (identify-
ing several commonly identified qualities that a “good death” requires, such
as freedom from pain and suffering, circumstances of death (e.g., home versus
hospital), and cultural variables in different studied countries, such as main-
taining independence, control, self-determination, and entrusting decisions to
others). For an excellent overview of the idea of a good death and of the emo-
tional issues surrounding death and dying, see SHERWIN B. NULAND, HOW WE
DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE’S FINAL CHAPTER (1995).
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that they would prefer to die at home,7 but only about 30 per-
cent of patients in the United States do so.8 Instead, we utilize
significant amounts of hospital-based resources at the end of
life,9 including costly therapeutic care and life-prolonging tech-
7. See GEORGE H. GALLUP INT’L INST., SPIRITUAL BELIEFS AND THE DYING
PROCESS: A REPORT ON A NATIONAL SURVEY (1997) (reporting results of a sur-
vey of U.S. residents commissioned by the Nathan Cummings Foundation
and Fetzer Institute); I.J. Higginson & G.J. Sen-Gupta, Place of Care in Ad-
vanced Cancer: A Qualitative Systematic Literature Review of Patient Prefer-
ences, 3 J. PALLIATIVE. MED. 289, 297−300 (2000) (finding that despite that
majority of British patients suffering from serious illnesses wish to die at
home, most die in either hospital or a long-term care facility).
8. See Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Bene-
ficiaries: Site of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000,
2005, and 2009, 309 JAMA 470 (2013) (concluding that, although only 24.6
percent of patients died in hospital in 2009 compared with 32.6 percent in
2000, percentages of deaths in long-term care facilities held steady at around
27 percent and deaths at home rose from 30.7 percent in 2000 to 33.5 percent
in 2009); YAFU ZHAO & WILLIAM ENCINOSA, THE COSTS OF END-OF-LIFE
HOSPITALIZATIONS (2009), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53605/ (describing data from 2007
indicating that one-third of Americans died in hospitals); Jeanne Lenzer, Un-
necessary Care: Are Doctors in Denial and is Profit Driven Healthcare to
Blame?, 345 BRIT. MED. J. 6230 (2012) (referring to another estimate that 65
percent of deaths in the United States occur in hospitals). Yet another study
found that 45 percent of U.S. deaths occur in hospitals and 22 percent in long
term care facilities. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEATHS
FROM 39 SELECTED CAUSES BY PLACE OF DEATH, STATUS OF DECEDENT WHEN
DEATH OCCURRED IN HOSPITAL OR MEDICAL CENTER, AND AGE: UNITED STATES
1995-2005 (2009).
9. It is well documented that one-third of medical expenses for the last
year of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and
technologies in that final month account for nearly 80 percent of these costs.
See Baohui Zhang, et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associa-
tions with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 480, 482−84
(2009). Moreover, 30 percent of Medicare dollars spent go to care for the 5
percent of Medicare beneficiaries who die each year. See Amber E. Barnato et
al., Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at
the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 363, 363−64 (2004); see also Teno et al.,
supra note 8, at 473 tbl.2 (noting that, in 2009, 29.2 percent of patients who
died had received care in an ICU in the previous thirty days); Donald M.
Berwick & Andrew Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care, 307
JAMA 1513 (2012) (describing six categories of healthcare spending waste,
including overtreatment, such as use of surgery when watchful waiting is
better and unwanted intensive care at the end of life, and estimating that
wasteful spending in the overtreatment category accounts for between $158
billion and $226 billion in 2011).
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nology, even when it is very likely that the benefits in terms of
enhanced quality of life or increased survival time are limited
or nonexistent.10 Many patients in the United States receive
invasive interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation
and Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”) care even when death is im-
minent.11
At the same time, we delay and then underutilize hospice and
palliative care.12 Most worryingly, these trends are worsen-
10. In a very recent study that attempts to measure physicians’ percep-
tions of when they are delivering “futile” care to their patients, the data sug-
gested that approximately 20 percent of patients in five critical care units
were receiving futile or “probably futile” treatment. See Thanh N. Huynh et
al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be Futile in Critical
Care, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1887, 1889–1890 & fig. (2013). The survey
instrument defined five situations in which treatment might be considered
futile or medically inappropriate: burdens grossly outweigh benefits; patient
will never survive outside an ICU; patient is permanently unconscious;
treatment cannot achieve the patient’s goals; death is imminent. Id. at 1888.
See also Robert D. Truog & Douglas B. White, Commentary, Futile Treat-
ments in Intensive Care Units, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1894 (2013) (cri-
tiquing the study design, arguing that legal complexities make it difficult for
physicians to say “no” to futile treatment requests, and pleading for better
communication and a conflict resolution process to address these situations);
R. Sean Morrison et al., When Too Much Is Too Little, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1755, 1755−56 (1996) (describing a case of aggressive treatment of an elderly
patient with advanced, terminal disease despite his repeated requests that he
receive no further treatment and observing that such overtreatment inter-
feres with quality of life for these patients with little offsetting benefit).
11. See Amresh Hanchate et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-
Life Costs: Why Do Minorities Cost More than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 493, 497−98 (2009) (surveying use of expensive end-of-life
interventions among a large sample of Medicare beneficiaries and finding
patterns of substantial expenditure on life-sustaining treatment in the final
six months of life). One palliative care specialist describes the ICU as a place
“where a Wild West culture makes it a challenge for palliative care to get a
foothold,” adding that it is difficult “to slow a wild horse, particularly one that
believes it can outrace death.” Jessica Nutik Zitter, They Call Me ‘Dr.
Kevorkian,’ N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:37 PM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/they-call-me-dr-kevorkian/ (adding
that she “believe[s] in letting the dying determine how and when they die, as
opposed to coaxing their organs at all costs”).
12. See Teno et al., supra note 8, at 474 (noting that although use of hos-
pice services has increased during the early 2000s, only 42.2 percent of Medi-
care beneficiaries with dementia and 59.5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries
with cancer received hospice services at time of death); Corita Grudzen &
Deborah Grady, Improving Care at the End of Life, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1202, 1202−04 (2011) (discussing overuse of therapeutic interventions
874 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
ing—the most recent data have found that, in 2009, 28.4 per-
cent of patients received hospice care for only three days or
fewer before dying, an increase from 22.2 percent nine years
earlier. Moreover, 29.2 percent of Medicare beneficiaries re-
mained in an ICU during the final month of life compared with
24.3 percent in the earlier-studied period.13 Of course, the chal-
lenge is to provide treatment that both accords with patients’
wishes and is clinically appropriate. Because patient prefer-
ences vary and it is difficult to predict when death is imminent,
this is not a simple process.
After providing some background on the legal and ethical
principles which govern end-of-life decision making in the
United States and the United Kingdom, this Article will look at
a particularly important U.K. response to similar concerns
about overtreatment at the end of life coupled with poor pallia-
tive care for dying patients: The Liverpool Care Pathway
(“LCP”) was adopted in the late 1990s as a model of best prac-
tices in the care of dying patients.14 The goal of the LCP is to
“ensure that all dying patients, and their relatives and carers
receive a high standard of care in the last hours and days of
their life.”15 More than a dozen years after its inception, how-
ever, the LCP is being phased out, due primarily to a public
backlash in response to instances of negligent or unauthorized
implementation.16
at the end of life, and advocating that better quality care often requires em-
phasizing palliative measures and avoiding unavailing therapies that risk
unnecessary suffering and iatrogenic harm); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Dis-
cussions with Physicians About Hospice Among Patients with Metastatic Lung
Cancer, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 954, 955−56 (2009) (finding that only
half of stage IV lung cancer patients discussed hospice care with their physi-
cians in the two months before death). These patterns are even more marked
among racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. See generally Bar-
bara A. Noah, The Role of Race in End-of-Life Care, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 349 (2012).
13. See Teno et al., supra note 8, at 470−73 & tbl.2 (finding that 11.5 per-
cent of patients were hospitalized three or more times in the three months
before death, up from 10.3 percent in the previous studied period).
14. See News Analysis: What is the Liverpool Care Pathway?, NATIONAL
HEALTH SERVICES (Nov. 27, 2012),
http://www.nhs.uk/news/2012/11november/pages/what-is-the-liverpool-care-
pathway.aspx [hereinafter What is the LCP?].
15. See id.
16. See Krishna Chinthapalli, The Birth and Death of the Liverpool Care
Pathway, 347 BRIT. MED. J. 4669 (2013); see also infra notes 86−100 and ac-
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The rise and demise of the LCP provides an informative case
study that illustrates the challenges in implementing guide-
lines for care at the end of life that respect patient autonomy
while providing humane and compassionate care. Despite the
United Kingdom’s advantages in the form of universal health
coverage and a centralized regulatory system for the practice of
medicine, the LCP was thought necessary to promote best prac-
tices in end-of-life care. The LCP nonetheless suffered from im-
plementation problems often enough to lead to its suspension,
which suggests that the most significant causes of poor care at
the end of life are less related to resources, access to care, or
the proliferation of consensus-based guidelines than to poor
communication among physicians, patients, and families about
end-of-life matters. Despite the differences between the U.K.
and U.S. medical delivery systems, the story of the LCP offers
useful lessons to physicians and institutions in the United
States that seek to provide high quality and compassionate
care to dying patients. This Article will explore the underlying
issues that plagued the LCP and that, similarly, pose great
challenges to patients and physicians here in the United
States, and will suggest lessons to be learned for the provision
of end-of-life care in the United States.
II. COMPARING HEALTH CARE CONTEXTS
A country’s health care system and culture have a profound
impact on the care of dying patients and many agree that care
of the dying in the United States is generally not well done. In
an international comparison of care at the end of life published
in 2010, researchers analyzed twenty-four indicators of end-of-
life care availability, quality, and cost and made comparisons
among forty countries. The United Kingdom and Australia
were ranked as having the highest “quality of death,” while the
United States tied with Canada for ninth place.17 The data
companying text (discussing criticisms of the LCP and reasons for its aban-
donment).
17. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE QUALITY OF DEATH: RANKING END-
OF-LIFE CARE ACROSS THE WORLD, figs.1, 5 & 6 (2010),
http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/QOD_main_final_edition_Jul12_toprint.pdf
(ranking the United Kingdom first for overall care, for quality, and for avail-
ability).
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from the United Kingdom also indicates that overall objective
health status there is far better than in the United States.18
The primary goal in the United States, dictated by both law
and ethical principles, is to provide end-of-life care according to
the individual patient’s wishes. In ideal circumstances, pa-
tients can express their preferences directly but, if the patient
has lost decisional capacity, physicians must seek guidance
from advance directives, conversations with family members,
or proxy decision makers, and the context of the patient’s val-
ues, preferences, and beliefs. Under this approach, the goal is
to preserve the patient’s autonomy even when he or she can no
longer articulate a preference. For very ill patients who lose
decisional capacity, an autonomy-based model of medical deci-
sion making is not effective unless these patients were previ-
ously willing to both discuss their preferences in advance and
to document them in some form of advance directive. However,
rates of advance directive completion remain low.19 In reality,
18. See Banks & Smith, supra note 1, at 65 (finding, in a study of self-
reported rates of disease in the United States and the United Kingdom, that
U.K. residents are significantly healthier than U.S. residents in the same age
range and that this difference exists across all ranges of socio-economic sta-
tus and education). With its substantially better overall health status, one
would expect higher per capita health spending in the United Kingdom, but
the opposite is true: the United States spends significantly more than double
the amount per person the United Kingdom spends. Id. at 2037 (noting that
the United States spends $5274 per capita versus $2164 in the United King-
dom). Part of the overspending problem in the United States has nothing to
do with end-of-life decision making, but instead has much to do with the lack
of control over the pricing of healthcare goods and services here compared
with the rest of the world. A good portion of the spending disparity is proba-
bly attributable to the fact that Americans pay significantly more for every
type of healthcare than any other country. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7
Trillion Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013, at A1 (comparing the price of
various drugs and procedures in the United States to that in other countries
and explaining that the high price tag for medical goods and services in the
U.S. results “not from top-notch patient care, . . . but from business plans
seeking to maximize revenue [and] haggling between hospitals and insurers
that have no relation to the actual costs of performing the procedure”).
19. A recent survey of 1700 California adults indicated that 80 percent of
the participants believed it was important to record their end-of-life wishes in
an advance directive, but less than one-quarter had actually done so. See
CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, FINAL CHAPTER: CALIFORNIANS’
ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH DEATH AND DYING (2012),
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/F/PDF%20F
inalChapterDeathDying.pdf. Only 42 percent of those surveyed indicated
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autonomy at the end of life is often illusory because patients
frequently are reluctant to articulate their wishes about end-of-
life care or even to acknowledge to themselves or to their fami-
lies the fact that they are dying.
In the United Kingdom, although patient autonomy plays an
important role in deciding whether to initiate or continue life-
supportive measures for seriously ill or dying patients, this
principle is supplemented with an explicit consideration of the
patient’s best interests, particularly when the patient’s wishes
are unknown or unclear, when the physician questions the
wisdom of the patient’s choice on medical grounds, or when re-
source constraints become relevant.20 Of course, there are sev-
eral very significant differences between the United States and
the United Kingdom, including structural aspects of health-
care delivery, the role of the physician, and cultural variables.21
Nevertheless, whether by necessity or design, medical law in
the United Kingdom reflects a greater willingness to consider
the patient’s best interests and quality of life, in addition to the
express wishes of the patient if they are known, compared with
the autonomy-dominated model of practice in the United
States.22
A. U.S. End-of-Life Law and Ethics
In the United States, individual patient autonomy, as imple-
mented in law via the doctrines of informed consent and substi-
that they had talked with a loved one about their end-of-life wishes, and only
7 percent had discussed these wishes with their physicians. Id. Other
sources indicate similarly low rates of advance directive completion. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-95-135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT:
PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS
UNCERTAIN 2 (1995) (concluding that “advance directives have been advocat-
ed more than they have been used” and “only 10 to 25 percent of Americans
have documented their end of life choices or appointed a health care agent”);
Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 32−36 (2004) (noting that less than 20 percent of
Americans have living wills, that studies suggest living wills rarely influence
the level of medical care, and that at least a quarter of patients with living
wills receive care that is inconsistent with their instructions).
20. See infra notes 38 to 40 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 51 to 66 and accompanying text.
22. See generally Barbara A. Noah, Two Conflicts in Context: Lessons from
the Schiavo and Bland Cases and the Role of Best Interests Analysis in the
United Kingdom, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 239 (2013).
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tuted judgment, is the primary principle that governs decisions
on behalf of those who have lost decisional capacity.23 However,
insufficient evidence of the patient’s wishes often will leave
physicians and family members in a quandary as to whether to
continue providing therapeutic treatment or life-sustaining
care. Uncertainty about prognosis in the case of terminal ill-
ness, or the possibility of some recovery of function in the case
of severe brain injury, adds to the complexity of decisions about
withdrawal of treatment or life-support measures. Even when
a patient retains decisional capacity (making substituted
judgment unnecessary), the patient’s choice may be irrational,
unreasonable or unwise, but the doctrine of autonomy, with
limited exceptions, protects these choices.
As for U.S. law, for the most part, medical treatment and de-
cision making, including end-of-life decision making, is a mat-
ter left to the individual states.24 U.S. end-of-life law attempts
to implement the autonomy principle via various mechanisms,
including advance directives, informed consent, and surrogate
decision-making. Each of the fifty states has its own statutory
and common law addressing health care decision-making, and
this fragmented system of regulation leads, not surprisingly, to
inconsistent standards, procedures, and results in the decision-
making process.25 All fifty states have incorporated the auton-
23. See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH
TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK, 51, 51−52 (2008)
(“Autonomy is paramount for patients who possess decision making capacity,
but it is also a major consideration for patients who lack this capacity. Their
wishes must be respected by the relatives or other healthcare proxies who
make decisions on their behalf.”). The American Medical Association (“AMA”)
has acknowledged that patients have a right of self-determination that in-
cludes the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, which is not lost
when a patient loses decisional capacity. See Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, AM. MED. ASS’N, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229
(1992).
24. One notable exception, the Patient Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”),
represents a federal effort to encourage the completion of advance directives,
with very limited effectiveness. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra
note 19; Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 19, at 32 (commenting on empirical
studies that demonstrate the PSDA’s lack of effectiveness).
25. For more detailed discussion on the U.S. end-of-life law, see generally
ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE (2004); Noah, supra
note 22, at 249−52 (describing varying standards of evidence for purposes of
allowing a surrogate decision-maker to refuse treatment on behalf of an inca-
pacitated patient).
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omy principle into their individual laws by acknowledging the
authority of advance directives or formally appointed
healthcare proxies,26 though standards of proof for withdrawing
or withholding life-sustaining treatment vary by state and by
medical context and some states restrict the circumstances un-
der which advance directives can be used to withdraw certain
types of care.27
Despite this heavy emphasis on the principle of autonomy,
U.S. law also includes references to and consideration of, the
principle of best interests. Many states’ laws already
acknowledge a place for best-interests analysis in making
treatment decisions for incapacitated patients.28 For example,
courts have recognized the concept of “proportionate treat-
ment,” and have suggested that “a treatment course which is
only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be consid-
ered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis
26. See Meisel, supra note 23, at 51−52.
27. See Stephen Arons, Current Legal Issues in End-of-Life Care, in LIVING
WITH DYING 733−36 (Joan Berzoff & Phyllis R. Silverman, eds. 2004) (explain-
ing, for example, that some state statutes restrict which treatments patients
can forego via an advance directive or at the direction of a proxy, such as
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, and some states do not in-
clude permanent unconsciousness as a condition which can trigger the provi-
sions of an advance directive). About one-third of states exclude permanent
unconsciousness as a condition for which advance directives can be used to
withhold or withdraw care and at least three-quarters of states permit indi-
vidual healthcare providers to refuse to carry out patient wishes, for reasons
of conscience or for no reason at all. See id. at 730, 734.
28. For example, New York permits an appointed healthcare agent to
make a decision, in the absence of information about the patient’s wishes, to
withdraw care in accordance with the patient’s best interests, but the statute
contains an express exception for artificial nutrition and hydration. Only if
the patient has specifically spoken on this matter may the healthcare agent
request the withdrawal of this type of life-sustaining medical technology. See
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(4) (McKinney 2014). State law in Massachu-
setts instructs healthcare proxies to make decisions for incapacitated pa-
tients based on what the patient would choose but, if this is unknown, in-
structs the proxy to decide what is in the patient’s best interests. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 201D § 5 (1997) (“After consultation with healthcare providers,
and after full consideration of acceptable medical alternatives regarding di-
agnosis, prognosis, treatments and their side effects, the agent shall make
healthcare decisions: (i) in accordance with the agent’s assessment of the
principal’s wishes, including the principal’s religious and moral beliefs, or (ii)
if the principal’s wishes are unknown, in accordance with the agent’s assess-
ment of the principal’s best interests.”).
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is virtually hopeless for any significant improvement in condi-
tion.”29 In one New York decision, the Superior Court refused to
authorize life-prolonging treatment for an incapacitated adult
who had suffered several strokes and had very little cognitive
function, holding that incapacitated patients retain their right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment and that the surgery would,
at best, prolong the dying process while providing “no human
or humane benefit” to her.30 And, in a well-regarded New Jer-
sey decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court envisioned a slid-
ing scale from pure autonomy-based decision making to pure
best interests-based decision making, depending on the type
and amount of evidence of the patient’s wishes that is availa-
ble.31
Occasional references to best-interests analysis aside, U.S.
law concerning end-of-life decision making favors, with little
exception, continued life supportive measures when the pa-
tient’s wishes are ambiguous or unknown. As the Schiavo liti-
gation and other cases of its type illustrate, many individuals
take the position that our end-of-life laws should default on the
side of continued treatment whenever a patient’s choice or best
interests are in dispute and should decline to assess the pa-
tient’s quality of that life in doing so.32
29. Barber v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (permit-
ting withdrawal of treatment from a comatose patient).
30. In re Beth Israel Med. Ctr. for Weinstein, 136 Misc.2d 931, 934−35,
942 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
31. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 324−26 (1985) (explaining that under a “lim-
ited-objective test,” life-sustaining treatments may be withdrawn or withheld
when there is some reliable evidence that the patient would wish it and it is
clear that the burdens of continued life with treatment outweigh the benefits,
but under a “pure-objective test,” treatment similarly may be withdrawn or
withheld in cases where the “net burdens of the patient’s life with the treat-
ment . . . clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives
from life,” even where there is no evidence of the patient’s preferences).
32. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (up-
holding a trial court decision to continue life-sustaining treatment despite a
proxy decision-maker’s request to withdraw it because the proxy “offered no
basis for such a finding other than her own subjective judgment that the con-
servatee did not enjoy a satisfactory quality of life and legally insufficient
evidence to the effect that he would have wished to die”); In re Conserva-
torship of Helga M. Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin Cnty. Minn. Prob. Ct.
1989) (upholding the surrogate’s request for continued treatment of the pa-
tient, who was in a persistent vegetative state and died of sepsis more than a
year later); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281
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B. U.K. End-of-Life Law and Ethics33
The legal system and its impact on medical practice in the
United Kingdom differs significantly from that of the United
States. Rather than a state by state patchwork of statutes and
common law opinions, there is a unified approach to end-of-life
decision making in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and
substantively similar standards in Scotland (though with vari-
ations in required procedures). There is no formal legislation
that exclusively regulates end-of-life care, although aspects of
the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 (“MCA”) are relevant.34
In the United Kingdom, patients with decisional capacity are,
of course, permitted to direct their care with guidance and in-
put from treating physicians. Patients who do not complete an
advance directive and who are either incapacitated or uncon-
scious are generally treated in accordance with their best in-
terests under the MCA.35 Pursuant to current U.K. law, de-
rived from the MCA, common law precedent, and guidance
documents for physician practice, the physician retains the ul-
timate authority to make treatment decisions for incompetent
(1990) (“[A] state may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’
of life that a particular person may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitu-
tionally protected interests of the individual.”). For information about the
Schiavo litigation, see generally Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of
Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 MIAMI L. REV. 107 (2004) (de-
scribing the intervention of politicians and religious organizations in the dis-
pute).
33. Much of this sub-section was derived and adapted from Noah, supra
note 22, at 252−55.
34. See Mental Capacity Act, 2005, c. 9 (UK), available at
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005. In 2008, the U.K. government also decided to
adopt a systematic ten-year plan to improve the quality of end-of-life care.
See Bradford H. Gray, England’s Approach to Improving End-of-Life Care: A
Strategy for Honoring Patients’ Choices, COMMONWEALTH FUND, July 2011, at
2 (2011), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2011/Jul/Engla
nds-Approach-to-Improving-End-of-Life-Care.aspx.
35. See SHAUN D. PATTINSON, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 32 (3d ed., Sweet &
Maxwell eds., 2011). Section 5 of the MCA authorizes physicians to act in the
best interests of incapacitated patients. See Mental Capacity Act, c. 9 (UK),
available at www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005; see also DEP’T FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005: CODE OF PRACTICE 67
(2007), http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/pls/portallive/docs/1/51771696.PDF (ex-
plaining that the best-interests principle does not apply when someone has
previously made an advance directive to refuse medical treatment).
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adults rather than the next of kin.36 The U.K. courts generally
do not resolve end-of-life disputes except to pronounce on the
lawfulness of the treatment that the physician proposes.37
The MCA specifically requires that the physician’s authority
is limited to acting in the best interests of incapacitated pa-
tients.38 Both the MCA and courts have defined “best interests”
to include not only medical interests but also the patient’s own
wishes, values, and preferences at the time they were compe-
tent.39 Thus, the concept of “best interests” in the United King-
dom includes within it deference to patients’ autonomous pref-
erences. According to guidance documents, if a patient does not
have a relevant advance directive, the physician may consider
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment “based on a range of
clinical criteria, including unresponsive physiological deteriora-
tion, overwhelming and irreversible pathology such as brain-
stem death, and progression of co-morbidity against a back-
ground of significant impairment of quality-of-life prior to the
critical illness.”40
36. See Dominic Bell, The Legal Framework for End of Life Care: A United
Kingdom Perspective, 33 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 158, 159 (2006).
37. Id. at 159.
38. See Mental Capacity Act, 2005, c. 4 (UK), available at
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005. Section 4(5) adds that, with respect to deci-
sions about life-sustaining medical treatment, the doctor “must not, in con-
sidering whether the treatment is in the best interests of the person con-
cerned, be motivated by a desire to bring about his death.” Section 4(6)(a)–(b)
adds that the doctor must, in evaluating the patient’s best interests, also con-
sider “the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular,
any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), [and]
the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had
capacity.” According to guidance documents, if a patient has not made a rele-
vant advance directive, the physician may consider withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment “based on a range of clinical criteria, including unre-
sponsive physiological deterioration, overwhelming and irreversible patholo-
gy such as brainstem death, and progress of co-morbidity against a back-
ground of significant impairment of quality-of-life prior to the critical illness.”
GEN. MED. COUNCIL, TREATMENT AND CARE TOWARDS THE END OF LIFE: GOOD
PRACTICE IN DECISION-MAKING (2010), http://www.gmc-
uk.org/static/documents/content/Treatment_and_care_towards_the_end_of_lif
e_-_English_0914.pdf [hereinafter GMC].
39. DEP’T OF HEALTH, HSC 2001/023, GOOD PRACTICE IN CONSENT (2001);
GEN. MED. COUNCIL, SEEKING PATIENTS’ CONSENT: THE ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS (1998).
40. See Bell, supra note 38, at 159. The General Medical Council’s guid-
ance also has specific recommendations for patients in permanent vegetative
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The U.K. General Medical Council (“GMC”) published a guid-
ance for doctors on Treatment and Care Towards the End of
Life (“Guidance”),41 which provides a very different picture of
the approach in the United Kingdom to these treatment deci-
sions compared with that of the United States. First, it is worth
noting that, although the publication is called a “guidance” and
contains a disclaimer that it is not a statement of legal princi-
ples or a substitute for legal advice,42 it has the effect of a se-
ries of regulatory statements. Doctors are informed that, in
cases where the Guidance states “you must,” this creates an
“overriding duty or principle” of practice.43
states and other forms of unconsciousness. In situations where there is un-
certainty about the continued care of patients who lack decisional capacity
and who are in persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) or similar conditions, the
guidance strongly emphasizes the patient’s best interests and recognizes that
many patients have not formally stated their wishes concerning care under
these circumstances. The guidance instructs doctors to use their own “special-
ist knowledge . . . and clinical judgement, together with evidence about the
patient’s views (including advance statements, decisions, or directives), to
identify which . . . treatments are clinically appropriate and are likely to re-
sult in overall benefit for the patient.” GMC, supra note 38. In England and
Wales, it also requires the doctor to request the appointment of an advocate
to participate in the decision making process when there is no legal proxy or
close relative who is willing to stand in that role for the patient. Id. at 18 (ex-
plaining that the Mental Capacity Act of 2005 requires the appointment of an
Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (“IMCA”) in such circumstances). The
IMCA has “authority to make enquiries about the patient and to contribute to
the decision by representing the patient’s interests but cannot make a deci-
sion on behalf of the patient.” Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 6. In addition to the GMC’s Guidance, in 2007, the Department
for Constitutional Affairs and the Lord Chancellor issued the Mental Capaci-
ty Act Code of Practice (“Code”). This Code provides practical guidance to
physicians, proxies, paid carers, independent advocates, and others for the
implementation of the MCA’s provisions, including a thoughtful discussion
about what the MCA means by “best interests.” See DEP’T OF CONST. AFF.,
supra note 35, at 64−91 (2007). The Code informs physicians that the MCA
does not impose a duty of compliance with the Code; “it should be viewed as
guidance rather than instruction.” Id at 1. It nevertheless goes on to say that
if one has “not followed relevant guidance contained in the Code then they
will be expected to give good reasons why they have departed from it.”). Id.
43. Id. at 7. By contrast, in the United States, doctors are regulated in the
state in which they practice by state boards of medicine, which occasionally
work with state legislatures to promulgate specific standards of practice (of-
ten addressing the prescribing of addictive drugs, for example) and to disci-
pline doctors who violate standards or mistreat or abuse patients. The state
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Where there is disagreement about whether a particular
treatment or intervention would be of overall benefit, either
among doctors, or among the doctor, his or her patient, or the
patient’s family or proxy, the Guidance sets out a process to
resolve the dispute.44 Interestingly, the Guidance specifically
addresses situations in which the proxy or decision maker re-
quests treatment that the doctor believes would not be clinical-
ly appropriate or of overall benefit to the patient. In these cir-
cumstances, the Guidance instructs the doctor to explain the
reasons for this opinion and discuss it with the decision maker.
The doctor is not, however, obligated to provide such treat-
ment.45 Although it is also the case in the United States that
physicians have no ethical or legal obligation to provide clini-
cally inappropriate treatment,46 the combined force of disa-
boards of medicine do not, however, routinely promulgate general standards
of practice for end-of-life care or any other area of medicine. The nearest
equivalents in the United States are professional organizations such as the
American Medical Association or the National Hospice and Palliative Care
Organization. These private groups publish ethical standards, statements of
practice, and principles of treatment, but they generally are not binding on
physicians, even those who are members of the organizations.
44. The Guidance recommends various nonlegal approaches as a first step,
including involving an independent advocate, seeking advice from a more
experienced colleague or obtaining a second opinion, holding a case confer-
ence, or using local mediation services, in order to work toward consensus.
See GMC, supra note 38, at 30 (adding that in seeking consensus, physicians
“should take into account the different decision making roles and authority of
those [they] consult, and the legal framework for resolving disagreements”).
If none of these steps effectively resolves the disagreement, the Guidance
instructs doctors to seek legal advice and to apply to the appropriate statuto-
ry body for review (in Scotland) or an appropriate court for an independent
ruling. See id. at 30. The Guidance adds that, in England, Wales, and North-
ern Ireland, the court will consider “whether treatment is in the patient’s
best interests—whereas in Scotland the courts will consider whether treat-
ment is of benefit to the patient.” Id. at 30, n.22 (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 18−19 (providing that, at this point, the decision maker or proxy
can request a second opinion or seek review from the appropriate statutory
body in Scotland or an appropriate court in the rest of the United Kingdom).
46. See AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Opin-
ion 2.035, Futile Care, available at
https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion2035.page (last visited Aug. 13, 2014) (“Physicians are
not ethically obligated to deliver care that, in their best professional judg-
ment, will not have a reasonable chance of benefiting their patients. Patients
should not be given treatments simply because they demand them. Denial of
treatment should be justified by reliance on openly stated ethical principles
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greement about what might be clinically appropriate, fear of
malpractice liability, and emotional pressure from a family,
will frequently lead to continued treatment. In other words, the
doctor in the United States is more likely to take the path of
least resistance.
The Guidance expressly addresses particularly complex end-
of-life scenarios as well, including questions about the provi-
sion of artificial nutrition and hydration, and issues arising
with patients who are permanently unconscious or who other-
wise lack decisional capacity.47 With respect to adults who lack
capacity and who are not expected to die within hours or days,
but who are in the end stage of a disease or condition, the
Guidance instructs doctors to provide artificial nutrition and
hydration if it would be of overall benefit to the patient and to
take into account the patient’s wishes and values.48 In these
circumstances, if the doctor believes that artificial nutrition
and hydration would not be of overall benefit to the patient, it
can be withheld or withdrawn, but the doctor must obtain a
second opinion from another doctor who is familiar with the
patient’s condition but is not directly caring for the patient.49
Overall, the Guidance suggests that physicians have significant
authority and even the obligation to decide that artificial nutri-
tion and hydration are not of overall benefit for particular pa-
tients. In the United States, by contrast, the physician can dis-
cuss the matter with the patient’s family or proxy but rarely
and acceptable standards of care . . . not on the concept of ‘futility,’ which
cannot be meaningfully defined.”).
47. See generally GMC, supra note 38, at 112−27 (discussing the provision
of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration generally to patients who have
capacity, adults who lack capacity with varying prognoses, and adults in
PVS). With respect to adults who lack capacity and who are not expected to
die within hours or days but who are in the end stage of a disease or condi-
tion, the Guidance instructs doctors to provide artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion if it would be of overall benefit to the patient and to take into account the
patient’s wishes and values. Id. at 57 (“The patient’s request must be given
weight and, when the benefits, burdens and risks are finely balanced, will
usually be the deciding factor.”). In these circumstances, if the doctor believes
that artificial nutrition and hydration would not be of overall benefit to the
patient, it can be withheld or withdrawn, but the doctor must obtain a second
opinion from another doctor who is familiar with the patient’s condition but is
not directly caring for the patient. Id. at 57−58 (stating that the doctor should
also consider seeking legal advice).
48. Id. at 57.
49. Id. at 57−58.
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possesses the legal authority to make a decision to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration over the family’s objections.50
C. System-wide Differences
1. Fragmented U.S. System of Health Care Delivery
Health care delivery in the United States, including end-of-
life care, suffers from the effects of our fragmented health care
delivery system, lack of insurance coverage or of consistency in
coverage, and a multi-payer private/public system. There are
wide variations in health insurance coverage among the states,
which have a significant impact on those patients who are too
young to be eligible for Medicare. For example, Massachusetts
has approximately 97 percent of its citizens covered through
employer coverage, compulsory purchase rules and subsidies
for low-income individuals to assist the purchase.51 By contrast,
30 percent of Texas citizens lack health insurance of any
kind—that is 5.8 million Texas citizens including 1.5 million
children. Only 47 percent of Texans have employer-based cov-
erage.52 The latest Census data confirm that Florida and Texas
have the lowest rates of insurance coverage in the nation.53
50. Texas’s Advance Directives Act is a rare example of a statute that al-
lows healthcare facilities to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment in
cases where the treating physicians believe that continuing such care is med-
ically or ethically inappropriate. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
166.046(e) (West 2003). Three other state medical associations also have ex-
pressed support for similar legislation. See Douglas B. White & Thaddeus M.
Pope, The Courts, Futility, and the Ends of Medicine, 307 JAMA 151, 151
(2012).
51. See COMMW. MASS., CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE MARKET 4 (2013),
http://www.mass.gov/chia/docs/r/pubs/13/ar-ma-health-care-market-2013.pdf.
52. See TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, www.texmed.org (last visited Aug. 8,
2014). To compound this dubious distinction further, Texas is now the largest
state in population to refuse to participate in the Medicaid expansion under
the Affordable Care Act, thereby denying approximately one million of its
citizens insurance coverage with a generous federal subsidy from the federal
government. See Jackie Calmes & Jonathan Weisman, Despite Fumbles,
Obama Defends Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A24, 31.
53. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Small Area Health Insurance Estimates,
CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/data/interactive (last visited
Aug. 5, 2014). Note that the ACA was not in effect at the time of the last cen-
sus.
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) aims
to minimize these state-by-state differences through a combi-
nation of strategies including the individual mandate54 but,
even after the ACA is fully implemented, many individuals will
continue to experience the effects of inadequate access to
health care for years into the future in the form of the long-
term effects of previously unmanaged chronic health condi-
tions. Variations in rates of insurance are at least partly to
blame for enormous variations in health care spending and
quality of care in different parts of the United States.55 Al-
though increasing insurance coverage to a near-universal level
will surely improve overall health status in the United States,
universal coverage alone is unlikely to have much impact on
the problems discussed here.
2. The National Health Service
The British National Health Service (“NHS”) was created in
1948 to provide health care for all people who need it.56 It is
funded through a combination of general taxation and contri-
butions to the National Insurance Program.57 The National
Health Service in the United Kingdom was traditionally a sin-
gle-payer system, but now sections of the NHS are increasingly
privatized and there is a political battle in the United Kingdom
over the system’s future.58 Some recently enacted reforms allow
hospitals to earn up to half of their incomes from private pay-
54. See Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
(Apr. 25, 2013),
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-new-health-reform-law/
(describing the ACA and providing a timeline for implementation of the Act’s
various provisions).
55. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care documents these differences
across a wide variety of spending topics, such as hospitalization in the final
month of life and care of chronic illness in the last two years of life. See gen-
erally Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care
System, DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
56. See FRANCIS LYALL, AN INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH LAW 114 (1994).
57. Id. at 114−15 (explaining that the NHS, once implemented, operated
mostly hospital property, which had been transferred to the Ministry of
Health via the implementing act, and that physicians and other specialists
such as pharmacists and dentists entered into contractual relationships with
the NHS).
58. See Ingrid Torjesen, Labour Will Halt Sell Off of NHS to Private Sector
if Elected, Burnham Says, 345 BRIT. MED. J. 6718 (2012).
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ing patients, though the Labour Party has promised a return to
previous policies if it regains control of the government.59
With NHS’s unified delivery system and single payer struc-
ture, it is not surprising that its critics express concern that
budget limitations exert pressure on physicians to engage in
covert rationing. In the United Kingdom, these resource limita-
tions are enforced within a system in which the general practi-
tioner physicians serve as gatekeepers to specialized and ex-
pensive medical care, basing their decisions about referrals to
specialists on clinical need rather than patient demand.60 Thus,
the U.K. system functions based on an agreement by the gov-
ernment and the medical profession that allows physicians to
retain their professional autonomy in how they allocate re-
sources, as long as they remain within the budgetary limita-
tions set by the government.61
In a single payer system, it is also likely true that pragmatic
concerns about how to utilize a finite pool of resources will lead
to consideration of the economic impact of continuing life-
supportive care where a patient will surely not recover.62 In
fact, much of the furor occasioned by the LCP in its last two
years stemmed from the revelation that hospices and hospital
trusts received financial rewards for meeting implementation
targets for the care pathway.63 By contrast, in the United
59. See id.
60. See George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How
Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and
Japan, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 357, 363 (1994).
61. See Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Dynamics of a Changing Health Sphere:
The United States, Britain, and Canada, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 114, 118 (May–
June 1999).
62. For example, one opinion in Bland noted that the NHS’s limited re-
sources necessitated allocation and rationing choices. See Airedale NHS
Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) 833 (UK) (“No one is under a moral duty
to do more than he can, or to assist one patient at the cost of neglecting an-
other. The resources of the National Health Service are not limitless and
choices have to be made. . . . [We have been] invited to decide the case on the
assumption that . . . resources were unlimited and we have done so. But one
is bound to observe that the cost of keeping a patient like Anthony Bland
alive is very considerable and that in another case the health authority might
conclude that its resources were better devoted to other patients.”).
63. See Jacqueline Laing, A Lethal Power?, 162 NEW L.J. 1444 (2012),
available at http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/lethal-power (dis-
cussing the rollout of the LCP after it was recommended by the U.K.’s De-
partment of Health and expressing concern that some hospitals had set tar-
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States, considerations of cost of care for individual patients are
often ignored, especially when the patient is insured.64 At some
level, however, the cost of ongoing care is beside the point—
those who find discussions of economics distasteful might nev-
ertheless adopt the position that providing therapeutic inter-
ventions or life-prolonging care for an individual in the last
days of life is not always ethically necessary or appropriate.
Finally, much of the difference between the two systems is a
matter of differing societal attitudes toward physicians and the
health care system. In the American system, patients tend to
operate as consumers of medical services (with doctors as ser-
vice providers) and want the best quality and the most care for
their money.65 By contrast, in the United Kingdom patients
view physicians in a more authoritarian role when they seek
advice and treatment. Moreover, U.K. physicians, working un-
der the unifying umbrella of the NHS, have more of a common
sense of identity that comes with the unified approach to care
delivery and therefore less fear of discord (or liability) when
withholding or withdrawing care for dying patients.66
gets of between a third and two thirds of all the deaths to be Pathway
deaths).
64. See Robert Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals
for Payment Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036 (2009)
(discussing the incentives for overutilization of medical services created by a
fee-for-service payment system).
65. The ACA creates a ‘Physician Compare’ website that allows consumers
to evaluate information on physician quality. See Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act § 10331(a)(1) (2010). Commentators disagree about wheth-
er patients really act as consumers looking for the best quality and value
when choosing physicians. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Patients as Regulators?
Patients’ Evolving Influence Over Health Care Delivery, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 13
(2010) (describing the new consumerism in healthcare); Mark A. Hall & Carl
E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical
Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 659 (2008) (questioning whether patients
are likely to act as discerning consumers of healthcare quality when they are
very ill).
66. See infra notes 111−112 and accompanying text (discussing varying
rates of malpractice litigation between the United States and the United
Kingdom).
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III. THE LIVERPOOL CARE PATHWAY FOR THE DYING PATIENT: A
CASE STUDY
A. Description and Goals
In general, “care pathways” are defined as “a complex inter-
vention for the mutual decision making and organization of
care processes for a well-defined group of patients during a
well-defined period.”67 The Liverpool Care Pathway for the Dy-
ing Patient was originally developed by physicians at the Marie
Curie Hospice in Liverpool, England to care for cancer patients
at the end of life.68 It is an attempt to establish best practices
with respect to end-of-life care for hospitals based on the
standard of care provided in hospices. Because approximately
58 percent of patients in the United Kingdom die in the hospi-
tal,69 the goal of the LCP is to describe and replicate hospice
practices in the hospital setting and for patients receiving care
at home,70 and thus to improve the quality of care for dying pa-
tients in the last days and hours of their lives. Over the years
since its inception, the LCP has been adopted and implemented
on a widespread basis by hospitals throughout the United
Kingdom and has been endorsed by the NHS and various pro-
fessional organizations.71
The LCP is intended to support physicians in making clinical
decisions about end-of-life care but it does not replace clinical
67. See What is the LCP?, supra note 14, at 2 (elaborating on the five key
elements of care pathways, including explicit statements of goals, coordina-
tion of care, and monitoring and evaluation of outcomes).
68. See Chinthapalli, supra note 16, at 4669.
69. See TIM BURR, NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, END OF LIFE CARE (2008),
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/07081043.pdf.
70. See JULIA NEUBERGER ET AL., MORE CARE, LESS PATHWAY: A REVIEW OF
THE LIVERPOOL CARE PATHWAY 3, 5 (2013), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/212450/Liverpool_Care_Pathway.pdf [hereinafter LCP REVIEW].
71. See What Is the LCP?, supra note 14 (explaining that the LCP was rec-
ognized in 2001 as a model of best practice by the National Health Service
(“NHS”) and was later incorporated into the Cancer Services Collaborative
Project and National End of Life Care Programme). The LCP has been
amended numerous times since its inception to reflect experience and chang-
ing circumstances based on regular audits of its use. As of now, it is in its
twelfth version. Id.; see also Katherine E. Sleeman & Emily Collis, The Liver-
pool Care Pathway: A Cautionary Tale, 347 BRIT. MED. J. 4779 (2013) (ex-
plaining that the rapid rollout of the LCP across England was part of the Na-
tional End of Life Care Programme and the End of Life Care Strategy).
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judgment. As the explanatory documents note, the “LCP is only
as good as the teams using it and must be underpinned by a
robust ongoing education and training programme.”72 It is not
intended to hasten or postpone death, and it neither recom-
mends the routine use of continuous sedation nor prohibits the
use of artificial nutrition and hydration.73 It also requires deci-
sion making by a multi-disciplinary team including a doctor, a
nurse, and other appropriate professionals in order to conclude
that the patient is likely to die within two to three days.74 The
assessment of the patient prior to making any clinical decisions
includes required inquiries into potentially reversible causes of
the patient’s condition, such as medication toxicity, kidney
failure, and infection. Once a patient is determined to be immi-
nently dying, the physician must explain the diagnosis to the
patient and family members or caregivers.75 The latest formal
audit of the LCP, published in 2012, found that patients on the
pathway were receiving a high quality of care, with most pa-
tients reporting that they were comfortable even in the last
hours of life.76
The LCP was one of a variety of integrated treatment ap-
proaches for patients who are actively dying. By no means are
all patients’ situations suited for the LCP.77 Implementation of
the LCP for a particular patient involves a series of decisions,
beginning with a determination that the patient is imminently
dying. Once a patient is placed on the care pathway, additional
decisions arise, including questions about whether to continue
artificial nutrition and hydration, whether sedation or cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation is appropriate, and how to manage
pain and other symptoms.78 It also requires that the team re-
consider the necessity of continuing with or initiating new tests
and treatments.79 The LCP also explicitly requires physicians
and others on the team to communicate with relatives and the
72. See What is the LCP?, supra note 14, at 3.
73. See id. at 1−2.
74. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, para. 1.2.
75. See id. at 6.
76. See MARIE CURIE PALLIATIVE CARE INST. & ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS,
NATIONAL CARE OF THE DYING AUDIT OF HOSPITALS: ROUND 3, at 5 (2011–2012),
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/sites/default/files/national_care_of_the_dying_au
dit_-_hospitals_exec_summary.pdf.
77. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, para. 1.12.
78. See id. at 7−8.
79. See id. para. 1.3.
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patient, where appropriate, about these decisions, and to ob-
tain consent from the patient if the patient retains decisional
capacity.80 The overall goal of the care pathway is to support
and guide physicians and other health care professionals caring
for the dying patient to provide care that keeps the patient
comfortable and maintains the patient’s dignity, while also
supplying information and emotional support to the family.81
Part of the goal of the LCP was to address a perceived need to
correct physician attitudes toward the acceptance of dying:
A major cultural shift is required if the needs of dying people
are to be met and the workforce are to be empowered to take a
leading role in this process. Dying patients are an integral
part of the population. Their death must not be considered a
failure; the only failure is if a person’s death is not as restful
and dignified as possible.82
Even in the U.K. system, which charges physicians with the
authority and responsibility to make health care decisions for
their patients who lack decisional capacity and to consider the
patients’ best interests as well as their individual preferences,
the LCP was thought necessary to address difficulties with
communication about end-of-life care, particularly about with-
holding or withdrawing therapeutic and life-supportive care.
The adoption of a care pathway acknowledges and formalizes
the idea that it is ethically acceptable and in fact “good care” to
cease therapeutic and life-supportive measures in certain cir-
cumstances. Even critics of the LCP do not recommend return-
ing to a system of care that treats dying patients as if they are
curable.
B. The Demise of the LCP
The LCP may be viewed as handing too much authority to
physicians, potentially at the expense of the well-being of pa-
tients. Certainly, it is understandable that grieving families
could misunderstand the implementation of the LCP in the
care of a loved one, particularly if the goals and reasons for the
implementation were not well-explained. In response to anec-
80. See id. at 7.
81. See id. para. 1.3.
82. See What is the LCP?, supra note 14, at 9.
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dotal reports in the press of frightening abuses,83 the Minister
of State for Care Support, a member of Parliament, commis-
sioned an independent panel to review the evidence of the care
pathway’s implementation.84 As the review panel concluded,
“when the LCP is used properly, patients die a peaceful and
dignified death.”85 Other commentators86 and many clinicians
praised the LCP and have indicated that they would choose it
for themselves.87 Nevertheless, a cluster of troubling imple-
mentation and administration issues illustrate that the LCP
requires substantial revision and clarification if it is to be re-
implemented in future end-of-life practice.
83. See, e.g., Sophie Arie, Inquiry Launched into Newspaper Story About
Babies on “Death Pathway”, 346 BRIT. MED. J. 1273 (2013) (describing false
allegations in a DAILY MAIL article alleging that babies were routinely
“starved” and that parents were coerced into consenting); John Bingham,
Nurse Accuses Top Hospital over Liverpool Care Pathway, TELEGRAPH, Mar.
7, 2013,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9913472/Nurse-accuses-top-ho
spital-over-Liverpool-Care-Pathway.html (describing a patient who spent six
days “on the pathway” and describing the patient’s care as “barbaric”). Some
alleged abuses were confirmed upon investigation of the LCP, including ex-
amples of patients who were placed on the pathway prematurely or who suf-
fered thirst because oral hydration was withheld while they were conscious.
See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
84. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, at 5. For a detailed chronology of the
events leading up to the request for independent review, see David Brooks &
Bee Wee, The Liverpool Care Pathway: What is the Furore in the Press
About?, 74 BRIT. J. HOSP. MED. 4, 4–5 (2013).
85. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, para. 1.8.
86. See, e.g., Bill Keller, How to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, at A23 (de-
scribing how his father-in-law, who had terminal and inoperable cancer, was
placed on the LCP, which entailed unplugging him from medications and
artificial nutrition and hydration and providing an intravenous drip to relieve
pain and nausea, and how he intermittently regained consciousness to remi-
nisce with his family and to receive Catholic rites, finally dying peacefully
several days later).
87. See Krishna Chinthapalli, Nine Out of Ten Palliative Care Experts
Would Choose Liverpool Care Pathway for Themselves, 346 BRIT. MED. J.
1303 (2013) (describing the results of a survey of U.K. palliative medicine
physicians); Krishna Chinthapalli, The Liverpool Care Pathway: What Do
Specialists Think?, 346 BRIT. MED. J. 184 (2013) [hereinafter What do Spe-
cialists Think?]; Zosia Kmietowicz, Doctors, Leaders, Charities, and Hospices
Back Liverpool Care Pathway, 345 BRIT. MED. J. 6654 (2012) (describing a
consensus statement issued by a group of twenty healthcare organizations in
support of the LCP).
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The cumulative impact of these implementation problems
doomed the LCP, and appropriately so, as its implementation
was occasionally seriously flawed. The review panel’s report,
entitled More Care, Less Pathway, provides a very thorough,
thoughtful, and balanced review of the LCP’s content and im-
plementation, along with recommendations for improvement.
Many of the implementation problems appear to spring from
lack of physician and other health care provider training, re-
sulting in poor or absent communication with patients and
families and faulty understanding of the LCP’s goals and prin-
ciples.88 There is little in the literature on the LCP to suggest
that its principles or goals are flawed—it was only flawed in
implementation.
Much of the criticism of the LCP in practice arises from cases
in which patients were mistakenly diagnosed as dying, and
then went on to survive for some time. The report acknowledg-
es the difficulty of diagnosing when a patient is imminently dy-
ing.89 As the LCP is designed for patients in the last hours or
days of life, prematurely withdrawing life supportive measures
can deprive patients of days of life.90 As the report reminds its
audience,
Dying is not only a physical event—it is the conclusion of a
life defined in its nature, content and connections within a so-
ciety . . . that are every bit as important as the mechanism of
how dying happens. Patients, their relatives . . . see them-
88. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, paras. 1.39−1.41 (explaining that the
multidisciplinary team approach to decisions about placing a patient on the
LCP contains some uncertainties about who is ultimately responsible for ini-
tiating the discussion and conducting ongoing patient assessments and de-
scribing lack of warning to or discussion with family members about the deci-
sion to place patients on the pathway).
89. See id. at 6, paras. 1.25−1.26, 1.35−1.36 (acknowledging the difficulty
in predicting when a patient will die and recommending research into the
biology of dying and the experience of dying in order to provide an evidence
base on which to improve quality of care and communication).
90. See id. para. 1.34 (“Families expect that, because a patient is placed on
the LCP, they must be in the last hours or days of life; but the Review panel
knows from the evidence . . . that some patients then remain on the pathway
for several days or longer. Relatives naturally become distressed, and this is
heightened if pain relief is not effective and ‘normal’ drugs, nutrition and,
particularly, hydration are discontinued.”).
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selves as people, not as biological specimens in the laborato-
ry.91
The authors of the report thus emphasized the need for doctors
and nurses to be more honest about the uncertainties of diag-
nosing imminent dying.92
Other problems leading to the backlash against the LCP
arose from misunderstanding on the part of the public, pa-
tients, and families of some of the terminology and goals of the
LCP. For example, the report notes that the term “end of life” is
quite vague and can mean vastly different things to different
people. To some, it might mean the last year of life for a person
with chronic or progressive disease whereas, in the context of
the LCP, “end of life” means the last days or hours of life.93
These differences in context and meaning can lead to misun-
derstandings about whether and when the LCP is appropriate,
both on the part of clinicians and family members.94
Similarly, the term “pathway” became negatively charged,
primarily as a result of journalistic hype. The Daily Mail has
repeatedly referred to the LCP as the “death pathway.”95 As
commentators have explained, the media campaign against the
LCP caused the term “pathway” to be misunderstood as a form
of “euthanasia by the back door” when it is in fact a “complex
clinical medical process being reported very hysterically.”96 One
91. See id. para. 1.25.
92. See id. para. 1.34.
93. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, paras. 1.9–1.11.
94. See id. (explaining that a doctor’s statement that a patient is at the
end of life might be misinterpreted and the LCP commenced prematurely and
recommending that the NHS publish clear definitions of time frames relevant
to decision making at the end of life that are consistent with those in use in
current policies and protocols).
95. See, e.g., Sue Reid & Simon Caldwell, Now Sick Babies Go on Death
Pathway, DAILY MAIL, Nov. 28, 2012 (“Until now, end of life regime the Liv-
erpool Care Pathway was thought to have involved only elderly and terminal-
ly-ill adults. But the Mail can reveal the practice of withdrawing food and
fluid by tube is being used on young patients as well as severely disabled
newborn babies.”). The United States has “death panels;” the United King-
dom has “death pathways.”
96. See Arie, supra note 83 (quoting Louise Shepherd, director of the chil-
dren’s hospital being accused); LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, paras. 1.14−1.21
(explaining that physicians and other health professionals who use the path-
way have misunderstood it as a set of instructions and prescriptions (a proto-
col) rather than as a guideline to making better clinical decisions for dying
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of the results of the press coverage, according to clinicians in-
volved in end-of-life care, was “scaremongering” which made
patients and relatives more likely to refuse the LCP and made
clinical staff fear complaints.97 The negative publicity also ap-
parently made physicians more hesitant even to raise the pos-
sibility of implementing the LCP with some patients and fami-
lies, potentially depriving some patients of an important option
concerning their care.98
More generally, the report criticized failures of communica-
tion, citing cases in which relatives were not informed that
their family member was being placed on the pathway or
why.99 U.K. law creates some complexities regarding informed
consent. As explained above, U.K. law requires consent for
treatment from patients who retain decisional capacity and
asks the physician to act in the patient’s best interests if the
patient lacks capacity. The decision to implement the LCP for a
particular patient raises issues of consent and communication.
Because the LCP is not a simple, individual medical procedure,
physicians technically need not seek consent from the patient
before it is begun.100 However, with respect to particular medi-
cal treatment decisions, such as use of powerful pain relief or
stopping artificial nutrition and hydration, discussion with and
consent from the patient is required if the patient is able to en-
gage in these discussions. Otherwise, physicians must also
make these medical decisions based on the patient’s best inter-
ests, in consultation with the patient’s family.101 Because the
LCP documents do not clearly address issues of treatment and
consent, the review panel urged improved communication
patients and recommending that the term ‘“pathway’ be abandoned and re-
placed with ‘end of life care plan’”).
97. See What Do Specialists Think?, supra note 87 (explaining that 57 per-
cent of doctors overall and 74 percent of palliative medicine physicians felt
that the negative press coverage had lowered utilization rates of the LCP).
98. See id. (quoting one surveyed physician who said that the negative
press “has caused additional distress for relatives at an already distressing
time . . . [and] a dilemma in judging if discussing the LCP will cause more
distress than the benefit of being on the LCP for coordination of care in the
dying phase”).
99. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, para. 1.29.
100. See id. para. 1.45.
101. See id. para. 1.46.
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about consent, and more generally about the LCP’s purpose
and appropriate use.102
In addition to reports of abuses in implementation, press re-
ports that various hospitals were receiving payments from the
U.K. Department of Health in exchange for placing patients on
the LCP prompted a torrent of criticism.103 The Department of
Health responded that, under its “Commissioning for Quality
and Innovation” program, local NHS commissioners were act-
ing under this program which permits rewarding hospital
trusts for meeting targets for excellence in health care, includ-
ing end-of-life care.104 When surveyed on the question of
whether the LCP was a cost-containment measure in disguise,
98 percent of physicians responding did not believe that re-
source pressures had influenced decisions to utilize the LCP,
though many of the respondents did not support the use of fi-
nancial incentives to encourage pathway use.105
The panel report recommends abandoning the LCP in favor
of developing guidelines on the principles of good palliative
care specific to different disease groups. It also recommended
that each dying patient have an individualized end-of-life care
102. See id. paras. 1.47–1.50 (recommending that the “clinician should ex-
plain their thinking, ensure it is understood, and offer referral for another
opinion if appropriate” and condemning instances of “brutal or callous lan-
guage” being used with family members). See also id. paras. 2.40–2.42 (em-
phasizing the need for effective communication with patients and families to
inspire trust and adding that “[g]ood communication is about the depth, and
not the length, of an encounter”).
103. See, e.g., John Bingham, NHS Millions for Controversial Care Path-
way, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 31, 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9644287/NHS-millions-for-con
troversial-care-pathway.html (finding, based on a FOIA request, that 85 per-
cent of hospital trusts had adopted the LCP and the approximately 60 per-
cent of these had received payments for placing patients on the pathway).
104. See id. (explaining that, because quality of care goals are set locally,
they can vary from one region to another, resulting in different levels of re-
ward payments or none at all, and that, while some hospital trusts set goals
to place a specific percentage of patients onto the LCP, others did not); see
also Zosia Kmietowicz, Health Professionals Defend the Liverpool Care Path-
way, 345 BRIT. MED. J. 7511 (2012) (quoting an NHS physician who said, on
the topic of payments to hospitals, “[t]hat some hospitals have been ‘paid’ for
putting people on this pathway, as reported, sounds grotesque, but the pay-
ment is recognition of what clinical consensus deems best practice. It is also
simply a product of the commodified health-care system that now exists, in
which every procedure is given a price.”).
105. See Chinthapalli, supra note 87, at 1303.
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plan.106 In addition to emphasizing the need for research into
the biology and experience of dying, the report recommended
that the National Institute for Health Research fund and con-
duct rigorously designed research into communication about
end-of-life issues from the perspective of patients and fami-
lies.107 It is unclear what guidance will take the place of the
LCP,108 but the experiences with it, both ill and good, have al-
ready generated a substantive national conversation about
what constitutes high quality end-of-life care.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE LIVERPOOL CARE PATHWAY
Although the United States and the United Kingdom operate
under very different health care finance and delivery systems,
both countries have struggled to improve quality of care at the
end of life. The United Kingdom possesses some significant
structural advantages over the United States when it comes to
delivering high quality, compassionate end-of-life care. The
United Kingdom has universal health care coverage; health
policy is developed under the unifying influence of the NHS
(rather than as a fragmented fifty state plus federal system as
in the United States); and U.K. law and policy requires physi-
cians in the United Kingdom to respect patients’ autonomous
wishes but also to consider their best interests, particularly
when their wishes are unknown or unclear. The survey data
say that the United Kingdom has succeeded in delivering the
best end-of-life care in the world,109 yet the report on the im-
plementation failings of the LCP suggests that, even under
these apparently superior circumstances, it is very difficult to
get end-of-life care right all of the time.
Although physicians in the United Kingdom have significant-
ly more decisional responsibility than those in the United
States, it is unsurprising that more physician authority alone
has failed to prompt consistent use of best practices in end-of-
life care. Even with the assistance of guidelines that have been
implemented on a widespread basis like the LCP, other inher-
106. See LCP REVIEW, supra note 70, at 10.
107. See id. para. 1.26.
108. See Christian Duffin, End of Pathway Leaves Questions About What
Will Take Its Place, 27 NURSING STANDARD 12, 12–13 (2013) (expressing con-
cern about the “vacuum” in guidance for palliative care practices that is left
behind with the recommendation that the LCP be abandoned).
109. See supra notes 17 – 18 and accompanying text.
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ent challenges involving communication and training pose bar-
riers to improvement. Despite all of the differences between the
two systems, both labor under the same primary obstacle to
good care: systemic problems with communication about end-
of-life choices among physicians, patients, and families. The
panel report’s recommendations for improvement in the United
Kingdom strongly emphasize improved communication, along
with more evidence-based guidance to physicians. As the report
explained, guidelines for best practices in end-of-life care are
only as good as the professionals who apply them in daily prac-
tice. In the United States, similar efforts are needed. However,
the United States faces additional barriers to quality care at
the end of life that are less prevalent or have less impact in the
United Kingdom. Some of these are, at least in theory, suscep-
tible to change while others are probably too deeply entrenched
for change to be realistically achievable.110 All of these phe-
nomena, however, have an immediate chilling or distorting im-
pact on the achievement of open and complete communication
among physicians, dying patients, and their families.
A. Barriers to Quality Improvement in the United States
1. Fear of liability for withholding or withdrawing life-
supportive measures.
Although physicians in the United Kingdom may fear cen-
sure from patients, families, or the licensing authority, there is
significantly less concern about potential legal liability for the
withdrawal of life-supportive measures.111 By contrast, in the
United States, physicians fear liability and will often practice
defensive medicine, including deliberate overtreatment at the
end of life, in order to avoid litigation.112 Physicians also may
110. Many of these obstacles to improvement also exist in the United King-
dom, despite its very different finance and delivery system, but detailed dis-
cussion of how these obstacles play out in the United Kingdom is outside the
scope of this article.
111. Rates of malpractice lawsuits in the United Kingdom are significantly
lower than in the United States. See Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Care
Spending in the United States and the Rest of the Industrialized World, 24
HEALTH AFFAIRS 903 tbl.3 (2005) (citing data that the United States “had 50
percent more malpractice claims filed per 1,000 population filed than the
United Kingdom and Australia, and 350 percent more than Canada”).
112. See Jeanne Lenzer, Unnecessary Care: Are Doctors in Denial and is
Profit Driven Healthcare to Blame?, 345 BRIT. MED. J. 6230 (2012) (describing
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hesitate even to initiate conversations about ceasing therapy or
withdrawing life-supportive care because these conversations
risk generating conflict, publicity, or litigation.113 A surprising
number of physicians in the United States have been accused
of, investigated for, and occasionally prosecuted for murder and
euthanasia in circumstances where they discontinued life-
supportive measures, provided drugs for pain control, or sedat-
ed patients whose suffering they were unable to alleviate in
other ways.114 One practice in particular, palliative sedation,
a meeting of one hundred thirty physicians from the United States, United
Kingdom, and Canada to discuss the causes of overutilization of healthcare
technologies and procedures and the group’s conclusion that malpractice lia-
bility fears constitute a major cause); Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers
to End-of-Life Care, 284 JAMA 2495, 2495 (2000) (explaining that physicians
overestimate the risk of malpractice lawsuits and that poor communication
by physicians about end of life issues increased the risk of litigation); Sean
Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a High-Tech Era, 364 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 21, e(21)(1) (2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1101392?ssource=hcrc (“Most
doctors are intensely risk-averse. We don’t tolerate uncertainty. Not wanting
anything bad to happen, we reflexively overtest and overtreat in order to pro-
tect our patients and ourselves.”); Phillip Wickenden Bale, Honoring Patients’
Wishes for Less Health Care, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1200 (2011) (de-
scribing the repeated hospitalization of a very elderly patient in a long term
care facility in contravention of surrogate decision makers’ request to provide
only comfort care in apparent reaction to a government fine of the facility due
to the accidental death of another patient).
113. As the Schiavo litigation demonstrated, once a particular case comes to
the public’s attention, the discussion can devolve into a larger debate about
the sanctity of life while losing sight entirely of the patient’s interests and
values. See generally Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons
from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 MIAMI L. REV. 107 (2004) (describing the
intervention of politicians and religious organizations in the dispute); Barba-
ra A, Noah, The Role of Religion in the Schiavo Controversy, 6 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 319 (2006) (elaborating on the intervention of the Catholic
Church in the controversy). Moreover, conflict about end-of-life care in the
United States contains the additional dimension of disagreement over wheth-
er decisions about withdrawal of life-support should be left to the family or
regulated or even decided by the government or the courts. See Lawrence O.
Gostin, Ethics, the Constitution, and the Dying Process: The Case of Theresa
Marie Schiavo, 293 JAMA 2403, 2403 (2005). Leaving it to the family in The-
resa Schiavo’s case created a schism between her husband and her parents.
Allowing the government to interfere led to a political circus.
114. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of
Murder and Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 334
(2012) (finding that over half of survey respondents had been accused of eu-
thanasia or murder by a patient or patient’s family member within the previ-
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uses high doses of sedatives and narcotics to induce uncon-
sciousness in patients whose suffering cannot be relieved in
other ways.115 In combination with the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration, the practice certainly can hasten
death.116 Although palliative sedation is not an explicit re-
quirement of the LCP, it is one option available to physicians in
the United Kingdom to manage otherwise intractable symp-
toms at the end of life, as it is here in the United States.117 In
cases where palliative sedation seems appropriate to relieve
pain or suffering, it appears that it is sometimes not offered out
of concern about potential liability for hastening death.118
ous five years and 4 percent of those surveyed had been formally investigated
for hastening a patient’s death); see also Lewis Cohen et al., Accusations of
Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1096,
1096–97, 1101 (2005) (describing examples of such accusations along with
occasional prosecutions and providing data for rates of prosecution in end-of-
life care cases).
115. See Cohen et al., supra note 114, at 1099–1100 & tbl.1 (discussing the
legality of palliative sedation when it is used as a last resort to relieve the
effects of pain, dyspnea, and agitated delirium).
116. See Bernard Lo & Gordon Rubenfeld, Palliative Sedation in Dying Pa-
tients, 294 JAMA 1810, 1812 (2005).
117. Some case law suggests that the practice, which consists of sedation of
the patient to unconsciousness (or whatever level that relieves suffering) and
withholding life-sustaining treatment including nutrition and hydration, is
not only legally permissible but required if no other options relieve the pa-
tient’s suffering. See Meisel, supra note 112, at 2499 (adding that, as long as
the physician’s intention is to relieve suffering rather than to cause death,
the practice is ethically and legally acceptable even if it hastens death); see
also State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989) (requiring physicians to pro-
vide sedation to a ventilator-dependent adult quadriplegic patient who re-
quested his ventilator to be shut off); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev.
1990) (same); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 2.201, Seda-
tion to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Care (“Palliative sedation . . . is an
intervention of last resort to reduce severe, refractory pain or other distress-
ing clinical symptoms that do not respond to aggressive symptom-specific
palliation. It is an accepted and appropriate component of end-of-life care
under specific, relatively rare circumstances.”).
118. Anecdotally, stories suggest that, even in hospice, providers misunder-
stand the ethical status of palliative sedation. See Janice Lynch Schuster,
Progress Needed on End-of-Life Care, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2011,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-04-18/national/35262334_1_palliativ
e-care-palliative-care-patients-hospice-care (describing a case in which a
friend “died gasping for air and begging her husband for help; she died with a
hospice nurse asserting that it was not the hospice’s philosophy to hasten
death”).
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Although physicians overestimate the risk of liability (in fact,
many valid claims for injuries due to medical negligence are
never litigated),119 open discussion about end-of-life choices and
transparency in decision making can only reduce this risk. Giv-
en the relatively high rate of malpractice litigation in the Unit-
ed States compared with other countries, it will be difficult to
assuage physicians’ concerns about potential liability in situa-
tions where there is disagreement among physicians and pa-
tients or families about care at the end of life. Nevertheless,
there is good evidence that open and honest communication
about these matters reduces conflict in many cases and, along
with it, the risk of litigation.120
2. Disagreement about the ethical status of artificial nutrition
and hydration.
While most medical ethicists and physicians agree that artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration is no different from other techno-
logical life-supportive measures and, as such, can be withheld
or withdrawn, even from permanently unconscious patients
under appropriate circumstances,121 some commentators, par-
119. See Meisel, supra note 112, at 2495 (explaining that physicians overes-
timate the risk of malpractice lawsuits and that poor communication by phy-
sicians about end-of-life issues increases the risk of litigation); Palfrey, supra
note 112 (“Most doctors are intensely risk-averse. We don’t tolerate uncer-
tainty. Not wanting anything bad to happen, we reflexively overtest and
overtreat in order to protect our patients and ourselves.”); cf. A. Russell Lo-
calio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) (finding that, of patients
with serious, disabling injuries that were clearly due to negligence, 5400 of
the studied cases did not file malpractice claims and only 3570 did file such
claims).
120. See F. Daniel Duffy, Dialogue: The Core Clinical Skill, 128 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 139, 140–41 (1998) (discussing evidence suggesting that phy-
sician traits such as empathy and listening improve the patient treatment
encounter); Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The
Relationship With Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and
Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 554–59 (1997) (finding that physicians who had no
malpractice claims also had different communication styles, including en-
couraging patients to talk, asking patients’ opinions, and ensuring patients’
understanding, compared with physicians with malpractice claims).
121. See George J. Annas, Nancy Cruzan and the Right to Die, 323 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 670, 670–71 (1990); Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1811–12
(describing the process of palliative sedation and the patients for whom it
may be indicated and recommending talking points to assist physicians in
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ticularly those arguing from religious perspectives, have lik-
ened withdrawal of nutrition and hydration to “starving a pa-
tient to death.”122 Guidance documents, such as the GMC
Guidance, in the United Kingdom specifically address ques-
tions about withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.
This specific attention, together with the fact that withdrawal
of this treatment was one of the more controversial issues
when it occurred as part of care for a patient on the LCP, sug-
gests that physicians, patients, and families in the United
Kingdom also think about artificial nutrition and hydration
differently than about other types of life-supportive care. De-
spite attempts in both countries to define artificial nutrition
and hydration as life-supportive technology like a ventilator or
dialysis, the fact remains that many families experience viscer-
al reactions to discussions about withdrawing this form of care.
This suggests that physicians will need to employ both empa-
thy and precision in discussing the withholding or withdrawal
of artificial nutrition and hydration in cases where families ini-
tially misunderstand this as “starving the patient.”
discussing the option with patients and surrogates); Robert D. Truog &
Thomas I. Cochrane, Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition: The Irrelevance of
the “Artificial” versus “Natural” Distinction, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2574, 2574 (2005) (adding that all nutrition and hydration, including hand-
feeding, can also be withheld or withdrawn under the same principles of au-
tonomy and self-determination and on a patient’s behalf by a surrogate deci-
sion maker); Meisel, supra note 112, at 2497 (explaining that, when the ap-
propriate standard of proof is met, withholding or withdrawing artificial nu-
trition and hydration is legally and ethically permissible and the patient’s
death results from the underlying condition). But see COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229–
33 (1992).
122. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Doctrinal Commentary
on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei, VATICAN,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cf
aith_doc_20070801_nota-commento_en.html (last visited May 22, 2015) (“Pa-
tients in a ‘vegetative state’ breathe spontaneously, digest food naturally,
carry on other metabolic functions, and are in a stable situation. But they are
not able to feed themselves. If they are not provided artificially with food and
liquids, they will die, and the cause of their death will be neither an illness
nor the ‘vegetative state’ itself, but solely starvation and dehydration. At the
same time, the artificial administration of water and food generally does not
impose a heavy burden either on the patient or on his or her relatives.”).
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3. Broader fear of “death panel” criticism.
U.S. culture is heavily divided on the most challenging issues
in end-of-life care. Physicians, bioethics experts, and other
stakeholders involved in health policy discussions acknowledge
that protocols or guidelines relating to end-of-life decision mak-
ing run the risk of provoking the pro-life elements of our politi-
cally and religiously polarized society.123 In recent years, the
United States has seen political and religious conservatives in-
tentionally undermine meaningful discussion about end-of-life
care in favor of appealing to their support base with superficial
or false and misleading characterizations of issues.124 These
sorts of deliberately deceptive statements frustrate any rea-
sonable attempts to engage in careful discussion and necessary
debate about ethically complex end-of-life issues.125 As the
123. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 86, at A25 (explaining that, when well-
respected bioethicist Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel was asked whether a program
such as the LCP could be implemented in the United States, he replied that
the chances were “zero” and that “[a]nything that looks like an official proto-
col, or guideline you’re going to get death-paneled”).
124. Sarah Palin’s fear-mongering rhetoric about government-sponsored
“death panels” provides a memorable example. See Sarah Palin, Statement on
the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7, 2009, 4:26 PM),
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=113851103434 (“The America I
know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with Down Syn-
drome will have to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats
can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity in
society,’ whether they are worthy of healthcare.”). Palin’s statement actually
referred to a proposal in President Obama’s healthcare reform legislation to
provide Medicare beneficiaries with optional and free counseling on end-of-
life decision making, including the option of making an advance directive to
announce the individual’s preferences about life-supportive care. See Michelle
Andrews, Rather Than Creating “Death Panels,” New Law Adds to End-of-
Life Options, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2010, at HE5 (explaining that, in the wake
of the outcry, legislators abandoned the provision). The damage created by
these lies was significant.
125. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False “Death Panel” Rumor
Has Some Familiar Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1 (describing the
false statements as attempts by those who are ideologically opposed to the
president to weaken his authority, not as genuine efforts to engage in a de-
bate about the merits of the actual proposal). In addition to Ms. Palin’s out-
rageous distortions, a newspaper editorial compared the proposal to reim-
burse physicians for end-of-life discussions with the Nazi Germany program
to execute children and adults with disabilities, and a newspaper columnist
described it as euthanasia to control costs. See id. at A2; cf. Rudy Ruiz, Open
Your Minds, America, CNN (Sept. 3, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-
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events leading up to the LCP’s abandonment illustrate, hype of
this kind, particularly in our instant information age, can have
a profoundly negative influence on health policy, to everyone’s
detriment.126 The law provides some help in creating consensus
by codifying fundamental rights of individual decision making,
but attempts to systematize end-of-life care via care pathways
or similar practice guidelines are likely to result in “death pan-
el” accusations or limiting legislation.127
In spite of all of this, there are a number of guidelines and
standards applicable to end-of-life care in the United States
that have been published and adopted by various professional
organizations. The American Medical Association (AMA), for
example, has adopted a number of position statements dealing
with end-of-life issues.128 Similarly, the National Hospice and
03/politics/ruiz.closed.minds_1_health-care-listening-
labels?_s=PM:POLITICS (suggesting that, with the healthcare debate, we
should be listening to differing opinions and acknowledge that changing one’s
mind in the face of new information is not a character flaw).
126. See Chinthapalli, supra note 16, at 4669 (“More insidiously, the deci-
sion to phase out the pathway shows how sensationalist journalism can dic-
tate health policy and gives implicit credence to some of the more outlandish
claims.”).
127. For an example of the type of backlash that can be expected, consider a
bill drafted by the National Right to Life Committee, the “Model Starvation
and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act.” This legisla-
tion, if enacted, would forbid any proxy decision maker or court from discon-
tinuing artificial nutrition and hydration for any incapacitated patient unless
that person has a valid advance directive specifically directing the withdraw-
al of such care. See MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (Nat’l Right to Life Comm. 2006),
http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/medethics/MODELN&HStateLaw.pdf. This leg-
islation would have the effect of creating a presumption in favor of continued
life support for the vast majority of Americans who do not have an advance
directive. See Stephen Arons, Palliative Care in the U.S. Healthcare System:
Constitutional Right or Criminal Act?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 309, 339–40
(2007) (discussing this and similar legislation and suggesting that, were it to
survive constitutional scrutiny, it would invite further legislation to limit the
removal of other types of life-supportive technology).
128. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 46 (“Physicians are not ethically
obligated to deliver care that, in their best professional judgment, will not
have a reasonable chance of benefitting their patients. Patients should not be
given treatments simply because they demand them.”); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 2.037, Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2037.page? (last visited June 23, 2015)
(“When further intervention to prolong the life of a patient becomes futile,
906 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
Palliative Care Organization recently released clinical practice
guidelines designed to improve the quality of palliative care.129
Nevertheless, none of these guidelines to improving care at the
end of life has been systematically implemented across hospi-
tals, still the site of most deaths around the country, and there
is no enforcement mechanism or requirement of compliance by
physicians. This is not surprising—the U.S. system, as de-
scribed above, is much more fragmented than that in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and is not regulated via a single National Health
Service and General Medical Council but rather by fifty state
medical boards and state legislatures.130 Moreover, any state
whose politics are influenced by conservative political and reli-
gious groups might very well prevent the implementation of
any specific guideline for end-of-life care.131
4. Debate about what is meant by “the sanctity of life.”
The public melée over the care of Theresa Schiavo illustrates
that many Americans hold the view that all human life is sa-
cred and must be preserved, even if the person in question is
permanently and irretrievably unconscious or imminently dy-
ing. While there are certainly British citizens who share this
view, British courts have taken the position that “a view that
life must be preserved at all costs does not sanctify life.”132 A
related concern involves the risk of pressure on the seriously
disabled to refuse treatment or on surrogate decision makers to
physicians have an obligation to shift the intent of care toward comfort and
closure. However, there are necessary value judgments involved in coming to
the assessment of futility. These judgments must give consideration to pa-
tient or proxy assessments of worthwhile outcome.”).
129. See NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY PALLIATIVE CARE (3d. ed., 2013),
http://www.nationalconsensusproject.org/NCP_Clinical_Practice_Guidelines_
3rd_Edition.pdf.
130. Federal insurance programs such as Medicare and, to a lesser extent,
Medicaid, have the opportunity to make a nationwide impact, but the glare of
conservative scrutiny has prevented much action as of now.
131. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing state legislative
limitations on what treatments can be foregone via advance directives and
surrogate decision makers).
132. In the Matter of a Ward of the Court, [1995] 2 ILRM 401 (SC) (Ir.)
(“[S]anctity of life was not a principle on which legal structures should be
based since it depended on a religious outlook that not everyone shared.”).
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refuse treatment on their behalf.133 In the Bland case, Lord
Justice Hoffmann wrote,
[t]he choice which the law makes must reassure people that
the courts do have full respect for life, but that they do not
pursue the principle to the point at which it has become al-
most empty of any real content and when it involves the sacri-
fice of other important values such as human dignity and
freedom of choice.134
Certainly, many in the United States, including some respected
jurists,135 agree with this position, but it is difficult to imple-
ment a policy that carefully considers this more nuanced con-
cept of the sanctity of life in the face of vocal opposition from
social and religious conservatives.136
5. Focusing on cost reduction may derail efforts at
improvement
Many commentators have recognized the general problem of
overutilization of health care resources and have recommended
the implementation of various programs designed to target this
133. For an excellent discussion of the effect of these “subtle pressures”
from a person living with a serious disability, see Ben Mattlin, Suicide By
Choice? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at A31.
134. See Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) 833 (UK).
135. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is an effort to define life, rather than to
protect it, that is at the heart of Missouri’s policy . . . . Life, particularly hu-
man life, is not commonly thought of as merely physiological condition or
function. Its sanctity is often thought to derive from the impossibility of any
such reduction.”).
136. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”). In fact, the pro-life movement
in the United States has little to do with protecting life in its broadest sense
and much to do with imposing a narrow worldview on those who do not share
it by maximizing opportunities to wield secular political power. Cf. Thomas L.
Friedman, Why I Am Pro-Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, at SR13 (question-
ing how individuals who label themselves “pro-life” can consistently oppose
reasonable gun control laws, environmental protection, and programs which
provide nutrition and early education for children living in poverty, and add-
ing that “[r]espect for the sanctity of life, if you believe that it begins at con-
ception, cannot end at birth.”).
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problem.137 Nevertheless, there is little evidence that guide-
lines for end-of-life care reduce costs, and at the same time
there is a great deal of risk that discussing cost reduction in
the same conversation with ideas about improving end-of-life
care by reducing overtreatment will generate controversy. In
both the United States and the United Kingdom, discussion of
cost savings in conjunction with discussions about minimizing
inappropriate treatment or life-supportive measures, leads to
public outcry while reducing opportunities for clear-headed
conversation about how to improve care at the end of life. And,
because high-quality palliative and hospice care also costs
money, it is unclear how much savings would accrue if we were
able to achieve a substantial system-wide reduction in ICU
care and hospitalization at the end of life in favor of emphasis
on palliative and hospice care. Therefore, it is probably better
to keep these issues separate and trust that cost savings may
prove to be a positive side effect of improved end-of-life care. In
any event, as this Article explains, there are other, better rea-
sons for making these changes.
B. Lessons from the Liverpool Care Pathway—Implementing
Best Practices
So, what can physicians and policy makers in the United
States learn from the United Kingdom’s experience with the
LCP? Care pathways or guidelines can improve quality of care
and reduce unnecessary care. At the same time, uncritical or
ill-informed implementation of such guidelines risks automat-
ing care in a way that ignores the importance of meaningful
communication about patients’ and families’ preferences, be-
liefs, and fears. It also risks serious error, that is, hastening a
patient’s death inappropriately. Communication problems con-
stitute the biggest shared obstacle in the United States and the
United Kingdom to excellent end-of-life care.
It is unlikely that a guideline like the LCP, which actually
describes a decision tree of steps for implementing quality care
in the last hours and days of life, will ever gain widespread
137. See, e.g., Christine K. Cassel & James A. Guest, Choosing Wisely: Help-
ing Physicians and Patients Make Smart Decisions About Their Care, 307
JAMA 1801 (2012) (describing various programs such as Choosing Wisely,
Less is More, and the Good Stewardship Working Group that aim to educate
physicians about commonly over–utilized tests and procedures).
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traction in the United States, for all of the reasons described
above. More realistically, health care providers and other
stakeholders in the United States should focus on guidelines to
facilitate communication between individual physicians and
individual patients about how to address end of life matters
such as ceasing active therapy, the introduction of palliative
care, transition to hospice, and the withdrawal or withholding
of life-prolonging measures. Truthful, substantive conversa-
tions centered around these topics can lead to the development
of individualized plans of care like those recommended by the
critics of the LCP. Additionally, for those patients who are will-
ing and able to engage in advance care planning, there is evi-
dence of real progress in advance planning with the prolifera-
tion of Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment
(“POLST”), which allow patients and surrogates to make and
document detailed, situation-specific medical orders for end-of-
life care.138 POLSTs and similar documents provide something
akin to the individualized plan of care recommended by the au-
thors of the LCP Review.
The U.S. law’s emphasis on autonomy and patient decision
making is unlikely to change in any dramatic way (though, as
suggested above, there is nothing to prevent physicians sup-
plementing it with information that will help the patient or her
surrogate evaluate what is in the patient’s best interests). The
influence of the pro-life culture also will persist and is unlikely
to change at anything more than glacial speed. Furthermore, it
is not possible to change the structure of how the practice of
medicine is regulated in the United States. In other words, a
top down solution is not available as it would be via the NHS in
the United Kingdom. Any regulatory approaches to change will
likely rest with the fifty states, since any federal effort to
promulgate guidelines, let alone requirements, for how end-of-
life decisions get made likely would be death-paneled. There is
a similar risk in many of the states and a patchwork solution to
this complex problem will bring its own challenges, as has al-
138. See Care at the End of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at SR10 (noting
that fifteen states have enacted laws authorizing the use of POLST forms and
nearly thirty other states are considering such legislation); see also About the
National POLST Paradigm Program, NATIONAL POLST,
http://www.polst.org/about-the-national-polst-paradigm/ (last visited Apr. 9,
2015) (providing detailed information about these forms, their legal status,
and implementation).
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ready been demonstrated with widely varying state approaches
to major health care issues such as abortion, stem cell research,
and medically assisted dying.
Despite these challenges, there has been some movement at
the state level to address these issues. At least two states, Cali-
fornia and New York, have enacted legislation to require physi-
cians to provide patients and families with information about
end-of-life choices. California’s Right to Know End of Life Op-
tions Act only requires physicians to provide information upon
request of the patient or surrogate,139 which was required any-
way under existing informed consent law. New York’s Pallia-
tive Care Patient Information Act requires physicians to pro-
vide information about prognosis, risks and benefits of various
treatment options, and rights to pain and symptom manage-
ment to terminally ill patients or their surrogates.140 Both laws
generated controversy prior to enactment, and physicians in
New York State have criticized the statute for vagueness141 and
a “heavy-handed intrusion into the doctor-patient relation-
ship.”142 The critics argue that a better approach to the problem
is to “focus on obstacles to respectful conversation about the
limits of medical efforts to extend life and about the alterna-
tives to disease-directed treatments.”143 Although these objec-
tions have merit, it is unsurprising that a state legislature be-
came impatient with the slow progress toward the goal of time-
ly and appropriate conversation and decided to move the pro-
cess along. It is too soon to say whether the New York law will
have much effect on the overutilization of care at the end of
life.
139. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442–442.7 (West 2009).
140. Violations of the statute are punishable by fines of up to $5000 for re-
peated offenses and physicians face up to a year in jail for intentional viola-
tions. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2010).
141. See Alan B. Astrow & Beth Popp, The Palliative Care Information Act
in Real Life, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1885 (2011) (explaining that, while
survival prognoses for cancer patients are relatively well defined, it is diffi-
cult to estimate life expectancy for the 75 percent of people who die from oth-
er diseases).
142. See id. at 1885–86 (“New York is attempting to prescribe legislatively
what should be a subtle, intimate conversation between doctor and patient
that often happens over time . . . . Admittedly, physicians have too often left
patients with advanced incurable illness unaware of the reality of their con-
dition.”).
143. Id. at 1886.
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In addition to these limited legislative interventions, there
are some strategies to implement best practices for end-of-life
care in the United States that are consistent with U.S. law and
that are realistic in the context of U.S. culture and politics.
Apart from physicians, patients, and families, there are a
number of other stakeholders that can participate in the move
toward best practices, including hospitals, medical schools, and
public and private insurers. Influencing physicians and these
stakeholders represents the only realistic avenue for influenc-
ing behavior and improving quality of care at the end of life.
The LCP experience demonstrates that guidelines alone can-
not promote best practices without physicians and other health
care providers who understand and support the guidelines and
are willing to invest the time and energy to implement them
with care. Physicians struggle with time pressures and the
growing physician shortage will exacerbate this problem.144
Coupled with patients who are reluctant to confront death and
prepare for it until it is absolutely unavoidable, and distressed
family members who understandably hesitate to make deci-
sions to withdraw or withhold care, the problem seems almost
insurmountable.
The LCP experience and its demise shines a spotlight on the
underlying problems of communication in both the United
Kingdom and the United States. Physicians, of course, are on
the front line. The United States will never adopt the U.K.’s
position that end-of-life decisions ultimately should rest with
the physician, nor should it. Nevertheless, physicians in the
United States can learn to initiate discussions with the patient
and family, to clearly explain the facts of the patient’s situation
as well as they can be determined, and to discuss with the pa-
tient and family the options available at this point, including
the patient’s prognosis with and without treatment or life-
supportive measures and the benefits and burdens of continued
treatment and life support.
It also seems clear that the development and publication of
guidelines for excellence in physician-patient conversation will
not, alone, bring about system-wide changes in physician prac-
144. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLEGES, GME Funding: How to Fix the Doctor
Shortage, AAMC,
https://www.aamc.org/advocacy/campaigns_and_coalitions/fixdocshortage/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (predicting a shortage of 91,500 physicians by
2020 and 130,600 by 2025).
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tice. In addition to an ingrained reluctance to have emotionally
challenging conversations with dying patients, many physi-
cians still value individual clinical autonomy above compliance
with even the best of guidelines,145 and may therefore decline to
follow them. Moreover, physicians often remain unaware of
guidelines, even those developed and published by organiza-
tions in their field of specialty.146 Finally, there is understand-
able suspicion that practice guidelines actually seek to reduce
cost as much as to improve clinical practice,147 a suspicion that,
in the case of end-of-life practices, could undermine the effec-
tiveness of the guideline in practice.
Nevertheless, insurers, managed-care organizations, and em-
ployers often rely on practice guidelines to define and limit the
scope of health benefits.148 If insurers condition payment on
compliance with guidelines, this may encourage and accelerate
the implementation of best practices.149 Enforcement mecha-
nisms may help to influence physician behavior but, realistical-
ly, it may take a generation of doctors training or re-training
toward these goals before these conversations become suffi-
ciently ingrained in medical practice at the end of life. There is
a tipping point, as with all cultural shifts, but reaching this
point collectively in the medical profession will take some time.
At a system-wide level, many organizations already are work-
ing on consensus-building through meetings of patient organi-
145. See Stefan Timmermans, From Autonomy to Accountability: The Role
of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Professional Power, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. 490, 494 (2005); see also supra notes 139−143 and accompanying text
(discussing physicians’ reactions to New York’s Palliative Care Information
Act).
146. See Dimitri A. Christakis & Frederick P. Rivara, Pediatricians’ Aware-
ness of and Attitudes About Four Clinical Practice Guidelines, 101 PEDIATRICS
825, 825–30 (1998) (surveying pediatricians about their awareness of four
pediatric practice guidelines and finding a range of awareness that varied
from 16 to 64 percent).
147. See Timmermans, supra note 145, at 496 (explaining that “[t]he path of
professional development is treacherous because the line between adopting
and enforcing is easily blurred” and that “clinical practice guidelines are
strongly associated with quality improvement and cost-control initiatives”).
148. Id.
149. See Wally R. Smith, Evidence for the Effectiveness of Techniques to
Change Physician Behavior, 118 CHEST 8S, 8S–17S (2000) (concluding that
there is no single effective method for changing physician behavior and that
multiple concurrent approaches are likely to work better than a single strate-
gy).
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zations and professional organizations, both as to methods of
communication and the substantive decisions that are required
at the end of life.150 As the experience with the LCP demon-
strated, guidelines for end-of-life care must be carefully stated
and evidence-based. The ACA mandates research on best prac-
tices in medicine to be conducted and disseminated. The ACA
requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “iden-
tify, develop, evaluate, disseminate, and provide training in
innovative methodologies and strategies for quality improve-
ment practices in the delivery of health services that represent
best practices in health care quality, safety, and value.”151
Based on this best practices research, the ACA then instructs
the Secretary to work to develop and identify new and existing
clinical practice guidelines.152 The federal mandate for this
work may have the added benefit of changing the culture over
time to one in which physicians in hospital settings (not just in
hospice) routinely consider and discuss topics such as transi-
tion to hospice with their patients early enough in the dying
process to improve the “quality of death.”
There have already been some successful system-wide initia-
tives to improve end-of-life care. The Department of Veterans
Affairs (“VA”) implemented policies designed to ensure access
to palliative care and hospice for veterans with terminal ill-
ness.153 In 2002, deaths of veterans were at an all-time high
150. The Conversation Project provides an example of a patient education
program designed to develop consensus and to educate patients. The program
seeks to “transform our culture so we shift from not talking about dying to
talking about it . . . [and] communicate about the kind of care we want and
don’t want for ourselves.” See CONVERSATION PROJECT,
http://theconversationproject.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); see also
End-of-Life Issues, AM. C. PHYSICIANS,
https://www.acponline.org/patients_families/end_of_life_issues/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2015) (describing initiatives to develop guidelines and educational
materials to promote conversations with patients about their end-of-life op-
tions); supra notes 128−129 and accompanying text (describing organizations
that promulgate guidelines that reflect consensus about best practices in end-
of-life care).
151. See Affordable Care Act § 10331 (2010).
152. See id. (requiring the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient
Safety to “facilitate the adoption of best practices that improve the quality,
safety, and efficiency of healthcare delivery services”).
153. See Thomas Edes et al., Increasing Access and Quality in Department
of Veterans Affairs Care at the End of Life: A Lesson in Change, 55 J. AM.
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and few VA hospitals had inpatient palliative care services. At
the same time, there was little access to home hospice care.
The VA identified the barriers to access to quality end-of-life
care and then established palliative care teams at each VA fa-
cility. It also partnered with community hospice care organiza-
tions.154 The results were immediate and impressive: within
three years of implementation, the number of veterans receiv-
ing hospice care at home had tripled, all VA facilities had a
well-trained palliative care staff and a formal palliative care
program, and 42 percent of veterans who died during that peri-
od had palliative care consultations.155 Those who developed
the plan noted that “a change of this magnitude requires a co-
ordinated and synchronous change at many levels and in many
aspects of the organization.”156
Of course, access to palliative care and hospice programs does
not guarantee their use—utilization will still depend on the ini-
tiative of either the physician or the patient to have the conver-
sation that will move the patient in that direction. Moreover,
the VA is in many ways like the NHS, a closed system funded
and regulated by government and staffed by government em-
ployees. System-wide changes like those at the VA in hospitals
public or private hospitals with multiple sources of funding,
staffed by a combination of employees and independent con-
tractors, and regulated by laws in fifty different states will
prove more challenging.
V. NOT THE END
As is frequently the case in matters of medical care, the law
is an inadequate and unwieldy tool for improvement. Similarly,
guidelines for end-of-life care are helpful in setting out best
practices but they are insufficient. The U.K. experience with a
well-intentioned effort to systematize best practices ultimately
failed, despite its many successes. We in the United States
would do well to realize the magnitude of the problem that we
face and to tackle it systematically and aggressively.
GERIATRIC SOC’Y 1645, 1645–49 (describing the creation and implementation
of a program to increase access to home hospice care for veterans).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1647–48 (describing the results of the program).
156. See id. at 1648.
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The good news is that in the United States the medical com-
munity and other interested groups have begun serious work
into methods to improve the quality of communication and care
at the end of life. The topic of frank communication with pa-
tients has received more attention within and outside of the
medical literature recently157 and, if the public discussion of
communication and truth-telling at end of life continues, it may
help over time to reduce the reluctance of individual physicians
and patients to speak plainly and make plans for care. There is
also growing interest in the integration of the modifying influ-
ence of palliative care into the care and culture of the ICU.158
The bad news is that we are a long way from understanding
how best to bridge the gap between theory and practice across
a vast and diffuse health care system. In end-of-life care, many
patients and families will require guidance, information, and
emotional support from physicians in order to make sound
medical decisions. Physicians must more willingly take on the
responsibility of initiating these emotionally challenging con-
versations in order to provide candid information and advice
about appropriate end-of-life choices. Sometimes, this will re-
quire the physician to inform the patient that additional
treatment is unlikely to ameliorate their condition or extend
their life and that it may, in fact, increase suffering with no off-
setting benefit. Continuing to provide treatment under these
circumstances on the basis that it is “what the patient or fami-
ly wants” deprives the patient of the best opportunity for a
good death and does a disservice to the patient, his family, and
the health care system more broadly. In the last days of life,
the physician’s obligation is not to work miracles but to use his
or her skills to “alleviate suffering, enhance well-being, and
support the dignity of the patient.”159 These are the last acts of
medical care, and they are never futile.
157. See, e.g., MAGGIE CALLANAN & PATRICIA KELLEY, FINAL GIFTS:
UNDERSTANDING THE SPECIAL AWARENESS, NEEDS, AND COMMUNICATIONS OF
THE DYING (2012) (describing the philosophy and workings of hospice care and
sharing narratives of dying patients who have found comfort in their beliefs
and in working to address unresolved issues in their lives).
158. The IPAL-ICU project seeks to improve palliative care in the ICU by
providing a central repository for exchanging evidence, expertise, and infor-
mation. See CTR. TO ADVANCE PALLIATIVE CARE, Improving Palliative Care in
the ICU, IPAL-ICU, http://www.capc.org/ipal-icu/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
159. See Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Defining Medical Futility and Improv-
ing Medical Care, 8 BIOETHECAL INQUIRY 123, 128 (2011).
